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ABSTRACT
A central result in the economic theory of liability is
that, if an injurer's liability equals the victim's loss,
then either the rule of strict liability or the rule of
negligence can induce the injurer to behave properly.
However, for this result to hold, the injurer must know
the victim's loss before the injurer decides whether to
engage in the harmful activity and, fortiori, before any
harm has occurred. This paper reevaluates the rules of
strict liability and negligence when the injurer's
information is imperfect. Two questions are addressed:
Under each rule, should the level of liability imposed on
the injurer still equal the victim's loss? Are the rules
of strict liability and negligence still equally
desirable? With respect to the first question, it is
demonstrated that the optimal level of liability generally
is equalto the victim's loss. With respect to the
second question, it is shown that if the injurer's
liability equals the victim's loss, then the two rules are
equivalent, but if liability is set optimally under each
rule, then strict liability generally induces the injurer




Stanford, CA 943051. Introduction
A central result in the economictheory of liability is that, if an
injurer's liability equals the victim's loss, theneither the rule of strict
liability or the rule of negligence can induce theinjurer to behave properly. [1]
To see why, suppose that injurers differin ternis of their gains from
engaging in some harmful activity, and thatthey all know what the victim's
loss will be if they doengage in the activity. Under the rule of strict
liability, an injurer would have tocompensate the victim for the loss, so
that only those injurers whosegains exceed the victim's loss willengage in
the activity. Under the rule ofnegligence, an injurer would have to
compensate the victim only if the injurer isnegligent- -that is, only if his
gain is less than the victim's loss.
Again, only those injurers whose gains
exceed the victim's loss will
engage in the activity. Thus, either remedy can
induce injurers to behave in asocially appropriate way. [2J
Note that the preceding
argument requires a strong assumption about the
injurers' information: each injurer must know thevictim's loss before he
decides whether to engage in the harmfulactivity and,fortiori, before any
harm has occurred. While it isreasonable to assume that injurers havesome
information about what the harm wouldbe, it is not realistic to assume that
this information is always accurate.For example, even if a schedule of the
losses that would be caused by varioustypes of driving accidents were
regularly published in newspapers or disseminated in otherways, it is clearly
implausible to assume that drivers would rememberevery detail.
This paper reevaluates the rules of strictliability and negligence when
the injurers' information about the victim'sloss is imperfect. Two questions
are addressed: Under each rule, should the level liability jjnposed
1injurer still eciualvictim'sloss? rules strict liability
negligencestill eaually desirable? [3]
With respect to the first question, it willbe demonstrated that the
optimal level of liability generally is iequal to the victim's loss.
Whether the optimal level of liability is above orbelow the loss depends on
the social desirability of the activity--that is, onwhether the average gain
of injurers is less than or greater than thevictim's loss.
To see why this is so, suppose that the courtmakes the injurer liable
exactly for the victim's loss, which will bereferred to as compensatory
damages. [4] Consider the effects ofthis policy under the rule of strict
liability. If an injurer's estimate of theloss is less than the true loss,
that injurer might be underdeterred- -that is, he might engagein the activity
even though his gain is less than the victim'sloss. But if an injurer's
estimate of the loss is above the true loss, that injurer mightbe
overdeterred- -he might not engage in the activity even thoughhis gain exceeds
the victim's loss. Thus, using compensatory damagesleads to two possible
errors.
Suppose, instead of using compensatory damages,the court adjusts
compensatory damages upward by some amount. Assumingthat injurers
consequently raise their estimates of their liability,this adjustment
decreases the number of injurers who will be underdeterredbut increases the
number who will be overdeterred. If the gains of most injurers arebelow the
victim's loss--that is, if the activity is socially desirable--thenthe
imposition of additional damages results in a netsocial benefit. Conversely,
if the activity is socially desirable, then it is optimal to imposeless than
compensatory damages on injurers since thebenefit from reducing
2overdeterrence is more important than thedetriment from increasing
underdeterrence
An analogous argument foradjusting compensatory damages can be made
under the negligence rule. The maindifference results from the factthat,
under this rule, the injurerexpects to be liable only if his gain is less
than his estimate of the victim'sloss. For reasons that will beexplained
below, this difference implies thatupward adjustments to compensatory damages
will not affect injurer behavior, whiledownward adjustments will have the
same effects as under strict liability.
Consequently, if the activity is
socially desirable, it is optimal under thenegligence rule to impose less
than compensatory damages oninjurers.
The second question- -regardingthe relative desirability of strict
liability and negligencewjl be answered intwo contexts, depending on
whether the court uses
compensatory damages or optimally adjustscompensatory
damages.
If compensatory damages areused, then the two rules are equivalent. The
reasoning behind this result is essentially thesame as in the opening
paragraph- -both rules will lead an injurer toengage in the activity if and
only if his gain exceeds his estimate of thevictim's loss.
However, if the court optimally adjusts
compensatory damages under each
rule, then strict liabilitygenerally is preferred to negligence. The
explanation of this result follows from the
earlier observation that, under
the negligence rule, upwardadjustments to compensatory damages haveno
effect, while downward adjustments have thesame effects as under strict
liability. Thus, if it is optimal to
adjust compensatory damages downward
under strict liability, negligencecan do as well. But if it is optimal to
3adjust damages upward, strict liabilityis superior to negligence. Stated
somewhat differently, if the activity is socially desirable,then strict
liability and negligence, with damages lessthan compensatory damages, are
equally good; but if the activity is sociallyundesirable, then strict
liability should be used and damages shouldexceed compensatory damages.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzesstrict liability
in a general model. Section 3 illustrates the resultsof section 2 in an
example. Section 4 compares strict liabilityand negligence. Section 5
contains some concluding remarks.
2. Strict Liability fttheCeneral Case
There are many potential injurers, each of whom obtains some gainfrom
engaging in the harmful activity. In addition,there is a fixed loss that
will result if an injurer engages in the activity. [5]Under strict
liability, an injurer will engage in the activityif his gain exceeds his
estimate of the sum of the victim's loss and the adjustmentto compensatory
damages. It is assumed that the injurerhas a point estimate of the victim's
loss, but knows the adjustment to compensatory damagesexactly. [6]
Social welfare is taken to be the sum of the gains to injurers
(conditional on their engaging in the activity) lessthe losses to victims.
The court's problem is to choose an adjustment to compensatorydamages that
maximizes social welfare (as well as- -see section 4below- -to choose whether
to use strict liability or negligence). In solvingthis problem, the court is
assumed to know the victim's loss, the distributionof the injurers' gains,
and the distribution of the injurers' estimates ofthe victim's loss.
The following notation will be used in the general case:
4gain of an injurer
density of gains across injurers (0 ￿g1 ￿ g ￿ g2)
loss of victim
estimate of victim's loss
density of loss estimates across injurers
(0 <11￿ 1' ￿ 12) [7]
d
adjustment to compensatory damages (optimal adjustment isd*)
W(d) social welfare
The population will be normalized so that thetotal number of potential
injurers is unity.
Consider the behavior of an injurer whosegain is g and whose loss
estimate is 1'. That injurer willengage in the activity if and only if g
exceeds l'-i-d, or, equivalently, if 1' <g-d.[8] Therefore, the fraction of
injurers with gain g who will engage in theactivity is H(g-d), where H(.) is
the cumulative distribution of h(.). Notethat, since li is the lowest value
of 1', no injurers with gains less thanl1+d will engage in the activity;
similarly, all injurers with gains greater than12+d will engage in the
activity.
Social welfare can now be expressed as: [9]
12±d





The first term represents the gains less the lossesof injurers whose gains
are between l1+d and 12÷d, only some of whom willengage in the activity
(those with sufficiently low loss estimates). The secondterm represents the
gains less the losses of injurers whose gains exceed12+d, all of whom will
engage in the activity.
















The first term represents the level of social welfare that would result if
injurers were to engage in the activity if and only if their gainsexceed the
victim's loss. The second term (the first term in braces) represents the
social loss due to some injurers actually engaging in the activity when their
gains are less than the victim's loss. And the third term representsthe
social loss due to some injurers not engaging in the activity when their gains
exceed the victim's loss.
It is apparent from (2) that a policy of awardingcompensatory damages (d
—0)will not lead to the first-best level of social welfare since both of the
terms in braces will be positive. In other words, some injurers will be
underdeterred and others overdeterred. It is not clear, however, whether it
is desirable to raise or lower the level of liability, since raising liability
will reduce underdeterrence but increase overdeterrence, and lowering
liability will have the opposite effects.
Assuming that W(.) is a strictly concave function of d, and that d*is an
interior optimum, the sign of the optimal adjustment to compensatory damages
is determined by the sign of W'(d) evaluated at d =0.From (2), this
condition can be expressed as:
> 1 > 12
(3) d* —0as -J h(g)f(g)(g-l)dg—J h(g)f(g)(g-1)dg.
11 < 1
6The first integral in (3) is themarginal reduction in the social loss due to
underdeterrence as d is raised,starting at d —0;the second integral is the
corresponding increase in the social loss due tooverdeterrence. Therefore,
whether compensatory damages should beadjusted upwards or downwards (or not
at all) depends on the relative importanceof underdeterrence and
overdeterrence
Since there is no reason to believe thatthe two integrals in (3) are
equal, it is generally not optimal under strictliability to use compensatory
damages without adjustment. However, unlesssome additional assumptions about
the form of h(.) and/or f(.)are made, not much can be said about when the
adjustment should be positive or negative.
Several alternative assumptionsare sufficient to determine the sign of
d* from (3). Suppose, forexample, that the distribution of theinjurers'
loss estimates, h(.), is uniform.
Then, without assuming anything about the
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ii
In other words, if the injurers'activity is socially undesirable--their
average gain is less than the victim's loss--then
compensatory damages should
be adjusted upward, while if theactivity is socially desirable,compensatory
damages should be adjusted downward. (To beprecise, it is the average gain
of injurers conditional on theirgains being within the range of the loss
estimates--between ii and l2--that Is relevant.)
7Another interesting special case is when the distributionof the
injurers' loss estimates, h(.), is symmetricalaround the true loss. Then, if
the distribution of the injurers' gains, f(.), fallsmonotonically, the
activity is socially undesirable, and (3) impliesthat d* > 0.If,
alternatively, f(.) were to rise monotonically, the activitywould become
socially desirable and (3) would imply that d* <0.
Note that the analysis of strict liability in thissection did not assume
anything about whether there is a systematicbias in the injurers' estimates
of the victim's loss--that is, whether the mean of 1' equals1. Thus, even if
the mean of 1' equals 1, compensatory damages generally are notoptimal under
strict liability. This point will be illustrated by the examplein the next
section.
3. Strict Liability in the Double-Discrete Example
The simplest version of the general model consists of havingthe
injurers' gains and their estimates of the victim'sloss each take on two
values. This will be referred to as the double-discrete example.Let:
gl,g2 possible gains of injurers (g2 >gj>0)
q fraction of injurers whose gains are
l-e,l+epossible estimates of victim's loss (equally likely)
Since the average loss estimate equals the true loss, noneof the results that
follow are due to a systematic bias among injurers in estimatingthe victim's
loss.
In order to have both some underdeterrence and some overdeterrencewhen
compensatory damages are used in the double-discreteexample, it is assumed
that:
8(5) l-e<g<l<g2<l+e
First consider strict liability withcompensatory damages. Given (5),
injurers whose gains are g1 willengage in the activity if their estimate of
the victim's loss is l-e, but not if itis l+e. Therefore, half the injurers
with gains of g1 willengage in the activity. Similarly, half of the injurers
with gains of g2 willengage in the activity- -also those whose estimate of the
victim's loss is 1-e. Thus, social welfareunder strict liability with
compensatory damages (d —0)is:
(6) W(0) —.5q(g1-l)+.5(l-q)(g2-l).
It will be useful tocompare this level of social welfare to the level of
social welfare that would occur in the first-bestoutcome. In the first-best
outcome, injurers would engage in the activity if andonly if their gains
exceed the victim's loss- -that is, if theirgains are g2, but not if they are
g1 (see (5)). Relative to this outcome, using the rule ofstrict liability
with compensatory damages causes twotypes of errors. The error of
underdeterrence occurs when injurers withgains of g1 think the victim's loss
is l-e. Compared to the first-bestoutcome, this error lowers social welfare
by -.5q(g1-].). And the error of overdeterrenceoccurs when injurers with
gains of g2 think the victim's loss is l+e. Thiserror lowers social welfare
by .S(l-q)(g2-l).
If compensatory damages are adjusted,then the appropriate expression for
social welfare depends on whether theadjustment, d, is positive or negative.
There are two relevantranges to consider. [11]
In the first range, d is positive andhigh enough to eliminate the
problem of underdeterrence that occurs withcompensatory damages, but not so
high as to worsen the problem of overdeterrence.Let d+ refer to any d in
9this range:
(7) 0 < g1-(l-e) ￿ d < g2-(l-e).
Now, injurers whose gains are will not engage in the activity even if their
estimate of the victim's loss is l-e, since (l-e)+d ￿ g•The behavior of
injurers whose gains are g2 is unaffected; theywill still engage in the
activity if their estimate is l-e, and theywill still not engage if their
estimate is l+e. Therefore, social welfare will be:
(8) W(d+) —.5(l-q)(g-l).
Similarly, in the second range, d is negativeand low enough to eliminate
the problem of overdeterrence that occurs with compensatory damages,but not
so low as to worsen the problem of underdeterrence.Let d- refer to any d in
this range:
(9) g1-(l+e) ￿ d < g2-(l+e) < 0.
Now, injurers whose gains are g will engagein the activity regardless of
their loss estimate. And injurers whose gains are gstill will engage in the
activity only if their estimate is l-e. Thensocial welfare will be:
(10) W(d-) —.5q(g1-l)+(l-q)(g-l).
Since g <1and g >1,it is immediately clear from comparing (6), (8),
and (10) that both W(d+) and W(d-) exceed W(0). In other words,under the
rule of strict liability, it is never optimal in this example to use
compensatory damages.
Whether compensatory damages should be adjusted upward ordownward in the
double-discrete example can be expressed as follows:
> >
(11)W(d+) —W(d-)as -.5q(g1-l) —.5(l-q)(g-l).
< <
This result, which is the analogue to (3) in the general case,has the
10following interpretation: An appropriate upwardadjustment of compensatory
damages can eliminate the error of underdeterrence, whilean appropriate
downward adjustment can eliminate theerror of overdeterrence. [12] Which
adjustment is most desirable depends on whicherror Is more important to
correct. It was shown previously that, relative to thefirst-best outcome,
the welfare loss from underdeterrence is-.5q(g1-l), and the welfare loss from
overdeterrence is .5(l-q)(g2-].). Thus, (11) statesthat compensatory damages
should be adjusted upward if the welfare loss fromunderdeterrence exceeds the
welfare loss from overdeterrence, and downward ifthe reverse is true.
It will be useful to provide another formulationof (11), which can be
rewritten as:
>
(12)W(d÷) —W(d-)as g —1,where g —qg1+(1-q)g2. < >
Thisresult corresponds to (4) in the generalcase and has the same
interpretation: If the injurers' activity issocially undesirable (average
gain less than victim's loss), thencompensatory damages should be adjusted
upward, while if the activity is socially desirable,
compensatory damages
should be adjusted downward. [13]
4. Strict Liability Versus Negligence
Under the negligence rule, an injurer will be foundliable only if his
gain is less than the victim's loss (In contrast to the
strict liability rule,
under which he would be liable regardless of hisgain). Thus, for the court
to be able to apply the negligence rule, it isnecessary to assume that the
court can determine an injurer's gain after theinjurer has engaged in the
harmful activity. But it is still assumed thatat the time the court chooses
11the adjustment to compensatory damages, it only knowsthe distribution of
gains across injurers. [14]
If compensatory damages are used under both rules, itis easy see that
strict liability and negligence are equivalent. Considerthe behavior of an
injurer whose gain is g and whose lossestimate is 1'. If g is greater than
1', that injurer will believe that he will notbe found negligent under the
negligence rule; therefore, he will engagein the harmful activity. The same
behavior would result under strict liability. If g isless than 1', the
injurer will expect to be liable under the negligencerule and to have to pay
1'; consequently, he will not engage in the activity. Again,the same
behavior would result under strict liability. Thus, if damages are
compensatory, both rules will lead an injurer to engagein the activity if and
only if his gain exceeds his estimate of thevictim's loss.
However, if damages are set optimally, then thestrict liability rule
generally is preferred to the negligence rule.To understand why, it is
necessary to examine two cases- -when the adjustmentto compensatory damages is
positive and negative.
First suppose that d is positive, and again consider an injurerwhose
gain is g and whose estimate of the loss is1'. It is easy to see that, under
the negligence rule, the injurer will behave just as if compensatory damages
were used. If g is greater than 1', the injurerwill believe that he will not
be found negligent; therefore, he will engage in theharmful activity even
though d is positive. And if g is less than 1',the injurer will expect to be
liable under the negligence rule and to have to pay l'+d; consequently,he
will not engage in the activity regardless of whether d is zero orpositive.
Thus, if d is positive, injurers will behaveunder the negligence rule as if
12compensatory damages were used.
Now suppose that d is negative. It will be shownthat an injurer's
behavior will be the same undernegligence and strict liability. If g exceeds
1', the injurer will engage in the harmfulactivity under the negligence rule
since he will believe that he will not be foundnegligent. The same behavior
would result under strict liability when d isnegative. If g is less than 1',
the injurer will expect to be liable under thenegligence rule and to have to
pay l'+d; therefore, he will engage in the activity if andonly if g >l'+d.
Again, the same behavior would result under strictliability. Thus, if d is
negative, the two rules are equivalent.
It is now easy to see why strictliability generally is superior to
negligence when damages are set optimally. Suppose it isoptimal under strict
liability to adjust compensatory damages upward. Thenstrict liability
clearly dominates negligence since every possibleadjustment to compensatory
damages under the negligence rule is equivalent to thestrict liability rule
with either no adjustment or anegative adjustment. Suppose, alternatively,
that it is optimal under strictliability to adjust compensatory damages
downward. Then strict liability andnegligence are equally desirable (with
the same downward adjustment under thenegligence rule). In general,
therefore, strict liability is preferable tonegligence.
It will be useful to relate this discussionto activities characterized
as socially desirable or socially undesirable (in thesense previously used).
If the activity is socially desirable, thenstrict liability and negligence,
with damages less thancompensatory damages, are equally good; but if the
activity is socially undesirable, then strict liability should beused and
damages should exceed compensatory damages.
135. concluding Remarks
This section discusses several points related to the interpretationof
the results and some extensions of the model.
(a) The results comparing strict liability to negligence maynot carry
over with a more realistic characterizationof the negligence rule. Suppose,
for example, that injurers are uncertain about what thestandard of care is
under the negligence rule, or that the courts make mistakesin observing the
injurer's care. Then each injurer will anticipate beingfound liable with
some probability and, presumably, this probabilitywould fall as the injurer's
care increases. In this framework, the analysisof the negligence rule could
differ substantially from that presented here. Consider, for example,the
effects of adjusting compensatory damages upward. In the model analyzedin
this paper, such an adjustment had no effect. But in a model inwhich, under
the negligence rule, injurers would be liable with some probability,there
clearly would be some effects. Moreover, these effectscould be quite
beneficial precisely because the probability of liability declineswith
injurer care. For example, given any upward adjustment, injurerswho take low
care (and who might otherwise be underdeterred)will anticipate a greater
increase in expected liability than injurers who take high care (andwho might
otherwise be overdeterred). [15]
(b) The result that it is generally optimal to adjust compensatory
damages also could be affected in a significant wayif the court, as well as
the injurer, were assumed to have imperfect information aboutthe victim's
loss. For example, consider the rule of strict liabilityand suppose the
court's imperfect information takes the same form as the injurers'imperfect
14information. In this framework, it can be shown thatcompensatory damages
without adjustment are optimal. [16] Thus,a crucial assumption in the
analysis in the paper is that the court has better informationabout the loss
than the injurer. This assumptionobviously is more realistic in some
situations than others. For example, a courtmay deal with some types of
harms- -suchas automobile accidents- -repeatedly, whereas eachinjurer may only
be involved with such harms infrequently, ifever.
(c) Notwithstanding the preceding twocomments, the theory developed in
this paper is broadly consistent with certaindoctrines in American law. For
example, one doctrine holds that activities classifiedas "ultrahazardous" or
"abnormally dangerous" should be subject to the rule of strictliability
rather than the rule of negligence. Theanalysis here is consistent with this
principle since it was seen that strict liability issuperior to negligence
when the activity is socially undesirable.[17]
(d) The results of this paper can be applied, withsome modification, to
the use of taxes, fines, or standards to dealwith externalities. The
analysis of taxes and fines would be similar to theanalysis of strict
liability. If the party subject to the tax or the fine hasimperfect
information about its level, then thatparty may cause too much harm or too
little harm as a result of the incorrectestimate of the tax or the fine.
Depending on the relative importance of the twotypes of errors, it generally
will be desirable to set the tax or the finehigher or lower than would be
optimal if the party's information were perfect. Theanalysis of standards
would be similar to the analysis ofnegligence since, if the standard is not
complied with, the party subject to the standard often ispunished by a
financial penalty. It may be optimal toadjust the penalty (and possibly the
15standard) if the party subject to the standard has imperfectinformation about
the penalty (or the standard).
(e) Allowing for the injurer's information aboutthe victim's loss to be
imperfect has some important general implicationsfor the theory of
externalities. In the more commonly analyzed case in which injurers'
information is assumed to be perfect, it is well knownthat if an injurer is
made to pay for the victim's harm, then the sociallydesired behavior of the
injurer will result. A corollary to this propositionis that the injurer's
payment should not depend on whether heis engaging in a socially desirable or
socially undesirable activity. For the reasonsshown here, neither of these
conclusions continues to hold if the injurer's information is imperfect.
16Notes
[*] Stanford University and National Bureau of Economic Research.Work
on this paper was supported by the Center for EconomicPolicy Research at
Stanford. During its preparation, I had the benefit ofcomments from Lucian
Bebchuk, Robert Cooter, Richard Craswell, Edward Golding, AlvinKlevorick,
Lewis Kornhauser, Jeffrey Perloff, Ivan P'ng, MichaelRiordan, William
Rogerson, Daniel Rubinfeld, Steven Shavell, and Ewart Thomas.
[1] See, for example, Brown (1973). He also considers the victim's
behavior, which is an issue that will not be dealt with here.
[2] This conclusion may not be correct if injurers are riskaverse, or
if their "activity level" (e.g., amount ofdriving) as well as their "care"
(e.g., speed) affects expected accident losses. These issues willnot be
considered here.
[3] Although these questions have not been addressed before ina model
which emphasizes the imperfect information of theinjurer, there are some
closely related studies. Most of these studies focus on whether, under the
rule of negligence, an injurer will meet the standard ofcare when the injurer
has imperfect information about the negligence standardor when the court has
imperfect information about the injurer's care. See, for example, Diamond
(1974), Golding (1982), Grady (1983), and Craswell and Calfee(1986). Some
attention also has been given to the optimal level ofliability and the choice
between strict liability and negligence when there isimperfect information.
See, for example, Calabresi and Hirschoff (1972), Cooter (1982), and Landes
and Posner (1983). Much of this literaturerecently has been synthesized and
extended in Shavell (1987, esp. Chs. 4.C & 6.C).
[4] Although reference will be made throughout thepaper to "the court,"
17this is meant in a generic sense to refer to whatever institution is
responsible for choosing the level of liability (including a legislature or an
administrative agency).
[5] In other words, there is no uncertainty about the likelihood or the
magnitude of the loss. It will become clear that the results will generalize
to a model in which both the probability and the magnitude of the loss may be
uncertain.
[6] More realistically, one could assume that the injurer also has
imperfect information about the adjustment to compensatory damages. This
generalization would not affect the results of the paper (provided, as seems
reasonable, that the average estimate of the adjustment is positively related
to the actual adjustment).
[7] It is assumed for convenience that the density of loss estimates
across injurers is independent of the density of gains across injurers.
[8] There is no loss of generality in assuming that the injurer will not
engage in the activity when his gain equals the sum of the lossestimate and
the damage adjustment.
[9] The following expression assumes that g < 11 and that g2 > 12. If
these conditions do not hold, it will be obvious how the expression for social
welfare is affected.
[10] It is straightforward to show from (1) that W'(d) < 0 if d > 1-li
and W'(d) > 0 if d < 1-12. Therefore, lpd* < 1 < 12+d*, making the following
decomposition of (1) well defined for the optimal value of d.
[11] It will become clear from the analysis below that d in one of these
ranges dominates d outside of these ranges. Therefore, valuesof d outside of
these ranges will not be considered.
18[12] Given the assumptions of the double-discrete example, it is
possible either to eliminate underdeterrence without worsening overdeterrence,
or to eliminate overdeterrence without worsening underdeterrence. Ofcourse,
this will not be true in general.
[13] Richard Craswell has pointed out to me that the results in this
section do not depend on the distribution of the injurers' estimates of the
victim's loss. This observation does not, however, applygenerally.
[14] The characterization of the negligence rule in this section is
overly simplistic in several respects. For example, in practice the
negligence rule imposes liability on an injurer with some probability that
depends on the injurer's care; see comment (a) in section 5 below.
[15] In an earlier version of this paper, each injurer's information
about the victim's loss was characterized as a probability distributionrather
than as a point estimate. In that version, strictliability and negligence
were not equivalent when compensatory damages were used (either rule could
dominate), and negligence was superior to strict liability whendamages were
set optimally (essentially for the reason suggested in thiscomment).
[16] This result is implicit in Shavell (1987, Ch. 6.C).
[17] To be more precise, it is strict liability withcompensatory
damages optimally adjusted upward that is superior to negligence withoptimal
damages when the activity is socially undesirable. Unfortunately, there does
not appear to be any evidence that indicates whether liability for
ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activities generally exceeds
compensatory damages. I am indebted to Richard Craswell for raising this
point.
19References
Brown, John Prather, "Toward an Economic Theory of Liability," Journal
Legal Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 1973), PP. 323-349.
Calabresi, Guido, and Jon T. Hirschoff, "Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts," Yale j Journal, Vol. 81, No. 6 (May 1972), pp. 1055-1085.
Cooter, Robert D., "Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages," Southern
California LReview,Vol. 56, No. 1 (November 1982), pp. 79-101.
Craswell, Richard, and John E. Calfee, "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards," Journal of Law. Economics, and Organization, Vol. 2, No. 2
(Fall 1986), pp. 279-303.
Diamond, Peter A., "Single Activity Accidents," Journal .fLegalStudies, Vol.
3, No. 1 (January 1974), pp. 107-164.
Golding, Edward L., "Economic Efficiency of Liability Rules for Joint Torts
with Uncertainty," Working Paper No. 67, Bureau of Economics, Federal
Trade Commission, October 1982.
Grady, Mark F., "A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence," Yale
Journal, Vol. 92, No. 5 (April 1983), pp. 799-829.
Landes, William M., and Richard A. Posner, "An Economic Theory of Intentional
Torts," International Review fj Economics, Vol. 1, No. 2
(December 1981), Pp. 127-154.
Shavell, Steven, Economic Analysis Accident j (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, forthcoming 1987).
20